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NATIONAL ENDOWMENT OF THE ARTS v. FINLEY THE
PROPRIETY OF VIEWPOINT IN ARTS FUNDING
STILL UNKNOWN
I. INTRODUCTION
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Supreme Court
ruled that the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) can con-
sider general standards of decency and the "values of the American
public" in deciding which artists should receive cash grants.' The
Court's decision in Finley II may have marked the end of a near
decade long battle over the constitutionality of the so-called "de-
cency and respect" clause, 2 but did it end the war? One might be
hopeful that it has, considering that the Finley II decision has both
sides claiming a victory of their own. 3 For politicians like former
House Speaker Newt Gingrich and organizations such as the Catho-
lic League for Religious and Civil Rights, Finley II represents a tri-
umph for common sense and family values. 4 Conversely, for the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and others, Finley II stands
for the principle that the government may not use the decency
clause to discriminate against viewpoints. 5 These conflicting spins
1. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998) [here-
inafter Finley I].
2. C. Thomas Dienes, On Speech Issues, Court Speaks in Many Tongues One
Message Loud and Clear: First Amendment a Work in Progress, 153 NJ. LJ. 735, Aug. 24,
1998, at S-11. Finley II had its origin in the 1989 NEA funding of an exhibit of the
homoerotic photographs by Robert Mapplethorpe and a grant to Andres Serrano
whose photograph, "Piss Christ," pictured a crucifix soaked in urine. See id. The
funding of such works by the NEA led to the 1990 enactment of a law imposing a
decency standard. SeeJoan Bikuspic, "Decency" Can Be Weighed in Arts Agency's Fund-
ing THE WASHINGTON POST, June 26, 1998, at Al. For a detailed explanation of
the history of this controversy, see infra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
3. See Douglas McClennon, Supreme Court Ruling on Decency Leaves Everybody
Claiming Victory, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 6, 1998, at El.
4. See id. McClennon states that "[t]he ruling seems to have a little something
for everyone." Id. The Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights praised Fin-
ey II as a victory for common sense and decency. See id. House Speaker Gingrich
and the Family Research Council praised it as well. See id.
5. See id. The ACLU, at the other end of the political spectrum, issued a press
rclease entitled, "ACLU sees silver lining in court's ruling for funding for the arts."
Id. ACLU Staff Attorney Marjorie Heins, one of the attorneys who represented the
National Association of Artists Organizations (NAAO) and the four artists chal-
lenging the NEA's decency clause stated "the Court's reading of the law is unrealis-
tic, ... [b]ut does relatively little damage to the First Amendment principle that
when the government is supporting free expression ... it cannot discriminate in its
funding decisions against unconventional or controversial ideas." ACLU Sees Silver
Lining in Court's Ruling on Funding for the Arts, ACLU PRESS RELEASE, June 25, 1998.
(433)
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on the Court's decision in Finley 11 seem to indicate that the Court
failed to articulate the precise nature of the constitutional limits on
governmental funding of the arts6 and that this war over the proper
balance between free expression and majority interests will wage
on.
7
The Supreme Court's decision in Finley II is part of a larger
ongoing debate over indecency, not just in the fine arts, but in
films, television, books and the Internet.8 This Note will consider
the Finley HI Court's contributions to the ongoing debate over what
restrictions the government may legitimately place on subsidies
when the First Amendment is implicated. Part II sets the stage for
consideration of this issue by explaining the circumstances leading
up to the constitutional attack on NEA funding.9 The initial basis
for the challenge should become clear when considered against the
framework provided by the Supreme Court in recent decisions.
Part III provides this framework by discussing limitations the
Supreme Court has placed on governmental regulations affecting
First Amendment rights generally and in the context of selective
governmental subsidies.10 Part IV examines the Supreme Court's
analysis in Finley II' Part V is a critical analysis of the Court's opin-
ion in light of previous decisions.1 2 Part VI considers the impact
David Cole, a Georgetown University law professor, and another attorney who ar-
gued the case on behalf of the artists, saw reasons to be heartened by the ruling.
See McClennon, supra note 3, at El. The spectrum of voices interpreting the stat-
ute with a positive, although conflicting spin is an indication of the subjectivity of
the decency standard, McClennon reasoned. See id. As a result, Gingrich and com-
pany get to claim victory for their version of family values, while Cole and his side
claim enforcement of the standards as meaningless. See id.
6. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., SavoringJudicial Fudge, 220 N.Y. L.J. 3, (1998). (noting
the ambiguity of the Court's opinion).
7. SeeJay Rosenthal, Music Industry Should Rally Against NEA Ruling 110 BiL-
BOARD 32 (1998). Rosenthal predicts:
The ramifications of this decision will undoubtedly go beyond the issue of
NEA funding, however. Such overwhelming Supreme Court support for
the proposition that viewpoint discrimination is constitutional will em-
bolden those trying to criminalize the sale and/or performance of certain
"offensive" music. Local governments will find solace in this decision
when imposing zoning restrictions against clubs offering "offensive" mu-
sic. Legislation against the sale of "offensive" music, especially rap, to
minors will be passed with much less concern about constitutionality.
Id.
8. See Bikuspic, supra note 2, at Al.
9. See infra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 33-149 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 150-259 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 260-293 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6: p. 433
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the decision will have on the future of arts funding and on govern-
mental subsidies affecting free expression generally. 13
II. FACTS
In 1990, the Performance Artists Program Peer Review Panel
(the "Panel") convened to consider ninety applications for funding
under the Performance Artists Program of the National Endow-
ment for the Arts.1 4 The Panel chose eighteen performance artists
for funding.15  In early May 1990, NEA Chairperson John
Frohnmayer asked the Panel to reconsider its recommendations to
fund three particular grants. 16 The Panel, after reconsidering the
applications of John Fleck, Holly Hughes and Tim Miller, unani-
mously reaffirmed its funding recommendations.1 7
Normally, such recommendations would have guaranteed the
granting of Fleck's, Hughes's and Miller's applications.' 8 Since
1989, however, the NEA had been embroiled in a highly publicized
political controversy surrounding the funding of two controversial
projects: a photography exhibit by Robert Mapplethorpe, which in-
cluded homoerotic images, and an exhibit by Andres Serrano enti-
tled "Piss Christ," which was criticized as being sacrilegious.1 9 The
13. See infra notes 294-307 and accompanying text.
14. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1462
(C.D. Cal. 1992) [hereinafter Finley 1]. The Chairperson of the NEA, with the
advice of the National Council on the Arts (the "Council"), is authorized to estab-
lish and carry out a program of grants-in-aid to individuals of exceptional talent
engaged in or concerned with the arts. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(c) (1988).
15. See Finley I, 795 F. Supp. at 1462. The NEA Chairperson was authorized to
utilize such panels of experts to review funding applications. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 959 (a) (4). The 1990 Amendments made mandatory the Chairperson's use of
advisory panels to review funding applications. See 20 US.C. § 959(c).
16. See Finley , 795 F. Supp. at 1462.
17. See id. The Chairperson arranged for the Panel to meet by teleconference
and personally participated in the meeting. See id.
18. See id. "As a matter of practice and custom, recommendation by a peer
review panel has been tantamount to the granting of an application." Id. How-
ever, Congress has set out formal procedures for awarding funding. See id. The
Chairperson, who is the ultimate decision-maker, is prohibited from approving or
disapproving any grant application until he or she has received the rccomm.enda-
tion of the 26-member Council. See id.
19. See Finley II, 569 U.S. at 2172. Congress reacted to the controversy sur-
rounding the Mapplethorpe and Serrano projects by eliminating $45,000 from the
agency's budget, the exact amount given to the exhibits by the NEA. See id. at 574-
75. The 1990 appropriations bill also included the creation of an independent
commission of constitutional law scholars to review NEA grant-making procedures
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controversy was still raging in the spring of 1990 when Fleck,
Hughes and Miller applied for funding.20
The NEA failed to abide by its former custom of basing fund-
ing decisions on the recommendation of a peer review panel. 21
When the Council convened to act on the recommended grants in
May, it deferred consideration of the Performance Artists Program
fellowships.22 Shortly thereafter, Frohnmayer polled members of
the Council regarding the Performance Artists Program fellowships
by telephone.23 Because a majority of the Council recommended
not funding their applications, the NEA advised Fleck, Hughes,
Miller, as well as a fourth artist, Karen Finley, that their grants had
been denied.2 4
20. See Finley I, 795 F. Supp. at 1462. Not only were members of Congress
condemning the grant-making process, but private special interest groups ran ad-
vertisements and circulated flyers calling for the defunding of the NEA. See id. In
fact, Karen Finley, the performance artist who, along with Fleck, Hughes and
Miller, had been approved by the 1990 Panel, became the topic of a syndicated
column report that criticized the content of her work and its pre-approval by the
NEA. See id. "The column also stated that Frohnmayer had been 'advised' by
'friends' of the NEA to veto several grants, including Finley's, to 'ease President
Bush's deepening troubles with conservatives on his suspect cultural agenda.'" Id.
21. Finley I, 795 F. Supp. at 1462. As previously stated, the Chairperson is
authorized to use expert panels to review funding applications. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 959 (a) (4). Although the Chairperson is the ultimate decision-maker, he or she
is prohibited from approving or disapproving any grant application until he or she
has received the recommendation of the 26-member Council. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 950(f). The Council is required to meet at the call of the Chairperson. See 20
U.S.C. § 955(d).
22. See Finley 1, 795 F. Supp. at 1462.
23. See id. At the height of this controversy, then-President George Bush fired
NEA Chairperson John Frohnmayer. See Government Funding and the First Amend-
ment (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.csulb.edu/-jvancamp/freedom3.html>.
24. See id. The artists' projects, that were denied grants, have been described
as follows:
Finley's controversial show, "We Keep Our Victim's Ready," contains
three segments. In the second segment, Finley visually recounts a sexual
assault by stripping to the waist and smearing chocolate on her breasts
and by using profanity to describe the assault. Holly Hughes' monologue
"World Without End" is a somewhat graphic recollection of the artist's
realizations of her lesbianism and reminiscence of her mother's sexuality.
John Fleck, in his stage performance "Blessed Are All the Little Fishes"
confronts alcoholism and Catholicism. During the course of the per-
formance, Fleck appears dressed as a mermaid, urinates on the stage and
creates an altar out of the toilet bowl by putting a photograph of Jesus
Christ on the lid. Tim Miller derives his performance "Some Golden
States" from childhood experiences, from his life as a homosexual, and
from the constant threat of AIDS. Miller uses vegetables in his perform-
ances to represent sexual symbols.
Finley II, 524 U.S. at 569 n.2. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citingJulie Ann Alasha, Note,
1991 Legislation, Reports and Debates Over Federally Funded Art: Arts Community Left
with an Indecent Compromise, 48 WASH. & LEE L. Rxv. 1545, 1546, n.2 (1991)).
[Vol. 6: p. 433
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The four artists filed suit against the NEA, alleging that the
organization had failed to follow statutory procedures under the
Privacy Act of 1974 and that the statute was unconstitutional as it
applied to them.2 5 In November 1990, Congress enacted Section
954(d) (1), the "decency clause," in response to the ongoing public
debate concerning NEA funding.26 The National Association of
Artists' Organizations (NAAO), fearing that the provision would
have a chilling effect on the artistic work of many of its members,
joined the plaintiffs in their suit.27 The plaintiffs amended their
complaint to allege that Section 954(d) (1) was void for vagueness
and impermissibly viewpoint-based, and thus, deprived the artists of
their First Amendment guaranty of freedom of speech.28
25. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 577. The artists also alleged that the NEA had
breached the confidentiality of their grant applications through the release of quo-
tations to the press, in violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). See
id. Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of their applications or restoration of their
grants, as well as damages for the alleged Privacy Act violations. See id.
26. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 576. Tide 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) provides:
No payment shall be made under this section except upon application
therefor which is submitted to the National Endowment for the Arts in
accordance with regulations issued and procedures established by the
Chairperson. In establishing such regulations and procedures, the
Chairperson shall ensure that-(1) artistic excellence and artistic merit
are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into considera-
tion general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public; 20 U.S.C. § 954(d).
The predecessor of § 954(d)(1) included the following language that Congress
added to the 1990 NEA Appropriations Act:
None of the funds... may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce
materials which may be considered obscene, including but not limited to,
depictions of sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of
children, or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a
whole, do not have serious literary artistic, political, or scientific value.
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1990 (Pub.
L. No. 101-21, Tide III, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 741). The NEA required that grant
recipients certify that they would not use the grant fund "to promote, disseminate,
or produce obscene materials." Government Funding and the First Amendment (visited
Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.csulb.edu/-jvancamp/freedom3.html>. Many artists
and arts organizations challenged the restrictions as an abridgement of their free-
dom of speech. See id. In a suit against the NEA by the Bella Lewitsky Dance
Foundation, thc court held that the requirement was unconstitutionally vague and
that it violated the First Amendment. See Bella Lewitsky Dance Foundation v.
Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp 774 (C.D. Cal. 1991). The Government did not appeal
the decision. See id.
27. See Finley I, 795 F. Supp. at 1470.
28. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 577-78. Thereafter, the district court denied the
NEA's motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id at 578. After discovery, the
NEA agreed to settle the individual plaintiff's statutory and as-applied constitu-
tional claims. See id.
5
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The Supreme Court granted review after favorable decisions
for the plaintiffs in both the District Court and Court of Appeals. 29
The Supreme Court, in an 8-to-1 decision, overruled the Court of
Appeals, holding that the government can consider "general stan-
dards of decency" when determining the propriety of an NEA grant
because there is no realistic danger that such criteria will be used to
punish the expression of particular views.30 Furthermore, the
Court held that the First Amendment does not prohibit the govern-
ment from allocating competitive funding according to the decency
criteria because Congress may "selectively fund a program to en-
courage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way."31 The Court not
only rejected the respondents' First Amendment challenge, but
also found the provision to be constitutional with respect to their
vagueness challenge.3 2
III. BACKGROUND
A. Government Regulation and the First Amendment
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
* . .abridging the freedom of speech."3 3 The Supreme Court has
declared that, at the heart of this right, is the principle that the
government cannot regulate speech based on its content.34 The
Court has defended this principle by requiring greater judicial scru-
tiny of content-based laws but has also recognized that government
restrictions based on the content of speech are often permissible.3 5
In addition to the Court's broad condemnation of content dis-
crimination, the Court has "focused emphasis on viewpoint discrim-
29. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 579-80. The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs on their facial constitutional challenge to
§ 954(d) (1). See id at 579. The NEA appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
holding that § 954(d) (1), on its face, impermissibly discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint and is void for vagueness under the First and Fifth Amendments. See id.
30. See Finley H, 524 U.S. at 583. "If the NEA were to leverage its power to
award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored view-
points, then we would confront a different case." See id. at 587.
31. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 588, (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193
(1990)).
32. See Finley I, 524 U.S. at 588.
33. U.S. Const. amend. I.
34. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 758
(Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., Aspen Law & Business 1997).
35. See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 99,
101 (1996).
[Vol. 6: p. 433
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ination as the ultimate First Amendment evil."36 Thus, it is clear
that the Constitution prohibits viewpoint discrimination. 37 Unfor-
tunately, the cases have not been "a model of clarity" regarding the
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination, often us-
ing the terms interchangeably.38
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,39 the Court considered
the constitutionality of a city ordinance that prohibited all picket-
ing within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any
school involved in a labor dispute.40 Thus, the ordinance allowed
peaceful picketing on the subject of a school's labor-management
dispute, but prohibited all other peaceful picketing.41 The Court
observed that "[t] he operative distinction is the message on a picket
sign. But, above all else, the First Amendment means that the gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. '42 Because the ordinance
clearly discriminated based on the content of the expression in-
volved, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. 43
36. Id.
37. See id. at 100. "The constitutional prohibition against 'viewpoint discrimi-
nation,' and the jurisprudential pursuit of its converse, 'viewpoint neutrality,' arise
from the most basic values underlying the First Amendment." Id.
38. See Heins, supra note 35, at 101.
39. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
40. See id. at 92-93. Earl Mosley, a postal employee, who for seven months
prior to the enactment of the ordinance had frequently picketed Jones Commer-
cial High School, brought the suit. See id. at 93. Mosley's peaceful protests con-
sisted of his walking the public sidewalk adjoining the school carrying a sign that
read: "Jones High School practices black discrimination; Jones High School has a
black quota." Id.
41. See id. at 92-93.
42. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. The Court explained the justification for this rule:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to as-
sure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the
right to express any thought, free from government consorship [sic].
The essence of this forbidden consorship [sic] is content control. Any
restriction on expressive activity because of its content would completely
undercut the "profound national commitment to the principle that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wise-open."
Id. at 95-96 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 259, 270 (1964)).
43. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 102. The Court did concede that there may be suffi-
cient regulatory interests justifying selective exclusions or distinctions among pick-
ets. See id. However, these justifications for selective exclusions must be carefully
scrutinized to tell whether they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial govern-
mental interest. See id. at 99. The Equal Protection Clause requires no less. See id.
at 101. The Court concluded that the ordinance imposed a selective restriction on
free speech "far 'greater than is essential to the furtherance of (a substantial gov-
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In Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent,44 the Court faced another city ordinance that implicated the
First Amendment. In Taxpayers for Vincent, the ordinance prohib-
ited the posting of signs on public property.45 A group of support-
ers of a Los Angeles City Council candidate challenged the
ordinance as an abridgement of its freedom of speech under the
First Amendment.46 The Court stated that "the First Amendment
forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."47 The Court, how-
ever, found this principle unmarred by the city ordinance at issue.
The Court observed that there was no indication of censorship or
bias in either the enactment or enforcement of the statute.4 8 The
statute had neither been designed to suppress distasteful ideas nor
applied to the campaign workers because of their views. 49 Further-
more, the text of the statute was silent concerning any speaker's
point of view.50 For these reasons, the Court held that the statute
was content-neutral and thus constitutional. 5'
44. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
45. See id. at 792. Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code states, in
pertinent part:
Sec. 28.04. Hand-bills, signs-public places and objects:
(a) No person shall paint, mark or write on, or post or otherwise affix,
any hand-bill or sign to or upon any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, curbstone,
street lamp post, hydrant, tree, shrub, tree take or guard, railroad trestle,
electric light or power or telephone or telegraph or trolley wire pole, or
wire appurtenance thereof or upon any fixture of the tire alarm or police
telegraph system or upon any lighting system, public bridge, drinking
fountain, life buoy, life preserver, life boat other life saving equipment,
street sign or traffic sign.
Id. (citing Los ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 28.04 Section 28.04).
46. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 792. The group supported Roland
Vincent by attaching 15 by 44-inch cardboard signs to utility poles at various loca-
tions by draping them over crosswires and stapling the cardboard together at the
bottom. See id. The signs read "Roland Vincent - City Council." Id. at 793. City
employees removed the signs, acting under the authority of § 28.04 of the Munici-
pal Code. Id. The group filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against the City and others. See id. The District Court
concluded that the city ordinance was constitutional. See id. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed holding that the ordinance was presumptively unconstitutional
because First Amendment interests were involved and the City had failed to justify
the total ban. See id. at 795-96.
47. Id. at 804.
48. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 805. The Court set forth the following framework for reviewing
a viewpoint-neutral regulation:
A government regulation is sufficientlyjustified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
[Vol. 6: p. 433
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In Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,5 2 the Court expounded on
the ramifications of the determination that a law is content-based
or content-neutral. 53 The Court stated that, generally, content-
based restrictions on speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, while con-
tent-neutral regulations need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny.54
The Court determined that the law, which prohibited the posting
of all signs on public utility poles, was content-neutral because it
would apply to every sign regardless of its subject matter or view-
point.5 5 The Court declined to apply strict scrutiny,56
The Court did apply strict scrutiny, however, to the "Son of
Sam" law at issue in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York
State Crime Victims Board.57 This New York law required that the in-
come received by any accused or convicted criminal from works
describing his crime, be deposited in an escrow account for the
benefit of crime victims and creditors of the criminal. 58 The Court
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 805. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). The Court's analysis under O'Brien and
its additional rejection of plaintiffs' arguments that the "overbreadth" and "public
forum" doctrines applied, led the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of
the ordinance. Id. at 800-17.
52. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
53. See id. at 642. In this case, numerous cable operators and programmers
challenged the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 which required cable television
systems to devote a specified portion of their channels to the transmission of local
commercial and public broadcast stations. See id. at 626.
54. Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 642. The Court used "the most ex-
acting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content." Id. But, "[iln contrast, regulations
that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny." Id.
55. See id. at 662. The Court not only examined the statute on its face to
determine if it was content-based, but it looked at its purpose as well. See id. at 645.
The Court rejected the arguments presented that the law was content-based on its
face or in its purpose. See id. at 645-53.
56. Id. at 662. The Court applied the O'Brien analysis to the content-neutral
regulation at issue, but deferred ruling on their constitutionality until such time as
the district court developed a more thorough factual record. Id. at 662-68. For the
O'Brien analysis, see supra note 52.
57. 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991). Tojustify the differential treatment, "the State
must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Id. at 118. (citing Arkansas Writers' Project v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
58. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 109. The Son of Sam law stated:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal
entity contracting with any person or the representative or assignee of
any person, accused or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to
the reenactment of such crime, by way of a movie, book, magazine article,
tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presentation, live
9
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stated that such a law is "presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment" because "it imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech."59 Thus, the Court analyzed
the law under strict scrutiny. 60 Because the Son of Sam law was not
"narrowly tailored" to advance the State's legitimate objective of
compensating crime victims, it did not survive strict scrutiny and
was, therefore, unconstitutional. 61
In RA. V v. City of St. Paul,62 the Court applied strict scrutiny to
a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance that prohibited the display of any
symbol "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender."63 The Court's justification for ap-
plying strict scrutiny was that the ordinance not only discriminated
based on content, but actually rose to the level of viewpoint discrim-
ination.64 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, illustrated this obser-
entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of such accused or
convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding
such crime, shall submit a copy of the contract to the board and pay over
to the board any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of the contract,
be owing to the person so accused or convicted or his representatives.
Id. (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982)).
The statute was a product of the publicity surrounding the hunt and apprehension
of serial killer David Berkowitz, popularly known as the Son of Sam. See Simon &
Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108. Berkowitz's story was worth a substantial amount of
money by the time he was caught and his opportunity to profit from his notoriety
did not go unnoticed by the state legislature. See id.
59. Id. at 115 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)). The
underlying rationale for this principle is "that the government's ability to impose
content-based burdens on speech, raises the specter that the government may ef-
fectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Simon & Schuster,
502 U.S. at 116.
60. Id. at 118.
61. Id. at 121-23. The Court concluded that although the State had a compel-
ling interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the crime, the statute was
not narrowly tailored because it was "significantly overinclusive." Id. at 121. Inter-
estingly, the Court observed that if the Son of Sam law had been in effect at the
times of their publications, "it would have escrowed payment for works such as The
Autobiography of Malcolm X.... Civil Disobedience... and even the Confessions
of Saint Augustine." Id.
62. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
63. Id. at 380. (citing St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, ST. PAUL,
MiNN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). The challenge to the ordinance stemmed
from a decision by the city of St. Paul to charge the petitioner under the ordinance
for allegedly burning a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family. See ILA. V,
505 U.S. at 379-80. The trial court granted petitioner's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content-
based and, therefore, invalid under the First Amendment. See id. at 380. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court reversed, upholding the constitutionality of the statute. See
id. at 380-81.
64. See id. at 391.
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vation by reasoning that the law would allow fighting words to be
used by those arguing in favor of racial tolerance but would not
allow fighting words to be used by their opponents. 65 The Court
concluded that "[s] electivity of this sort creates the possibility that
the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas.
That possibility would alone be enough to render the ordinance
presumptively invalid .... *"66 Because the city failed to rebut the
presumption of invalidity, the Court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional.67
These cases illustrate the ongoing concern that the Court has
had about content neutrality. 68 Specifically, the fear is that the gov-
ernment will target certain speech and try to control thoughts on a
topic by regulating speech.69 As the Court stated in Turner Broad-
casting System, "laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Gov-
ernment seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to
suppress unpopular ideas or information or to manipulate the pub-
lic debate through coercion rather than persuasion."70 The Court's
use of strict scrutiny in the above cases illustrates this concern. 71
Certain contexts, however, such as a governmental subsidy scheme,
may alter the consequences of a content-based regulation, as
demonstrated by the following cases.
B. When Selective Subsidies Meet the First Amendment
Restrictions based on content and viewpoint are also generally
disfavored in the context of governmental subsidies. 72 There exist,
however, a number of competing principles that complicate the in-
quiry into the nature of the restriction. For example, the govern-
65. See id. at 391-92.
66. Id. at 394.
67. See tA.V, 505 U.S. at 395-96. The Court stated that "[t]he dispositive
question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is reasonably
necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling interests; it plainly is not." Id.
68. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, at 759.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. For an explanation of the basis for the content-based, content-neutral dis-
tinction, see Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46
(1987).
72. See Heins, supra note 35, at 168. Heins states that the Supreme Court has
ruled that viewpoint neutrality "governs the constitutionality not only of criminal
laws and other direct forms of government regulation of speech, but also the provi-
sion of government subsidies and other benefits." Id.; see also Perry v. Sinderman,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable
government benefit .. , [government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - especially, his interest
in freedom of speech.").
11
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ment can choose how to use its resources. 73 It can choose to fund
one activity at the exclusion of the other.7 4 Furthermore, the gov-
ernment can set conditions on grants to ensure that subsidies are
only used for authorized purposes. 75 The following cases illustrate
the manner in which the Court has applied these principles.
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation,76 a non-profit corpora-
tion, Taxation with Representation of Washington (TWR), sued the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury
and the United States, claiming that Section 501 (c) (3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code 77 was unconstitutional because the provision
conditioned tax-exempt status on the abstention from substantial
lobbying activities. 78 The Supreme Court rejected TWR's argument
that the denial of 501 (c) (3) status amounted, under Spieser, to an
"unconstitutional condition."79 The Court stated that "the Code
does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contributions to
support its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR any in-
dependent benefit on account of its intention to lobby. Congress
has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public monies."80
73. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
74. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
76. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
77. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3). Section 501(c) (3) exempts:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports or competition ..., or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which in-
sures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substan-
tial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation... and which does not participate in
... any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
Id.
78. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 542. Relying on Spieser v. Randal4 357 U.S. 513
(1958), TWR argued that the prohibition against substantial lobbying imposed an
"unconstitutional condition" on the receipt of tax-deductible contributions. See
Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. In Spieser, the Court examined a California rule that re-
quired anyone taking advantage of a property tax exemption to sign a declaration
stating that he did not advocate the overthrow of the national Government by
force. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 516. The Court held that "to deny an exemption to
claimants who engage in speech is in effect to penalize them for the same speech."
Regan, 461 U.S. at 545 (citing Spieser, 357 U.S. at 518).
79. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. The Court acknowledged that TWR was right
when it asserted that the government cannot deny a benefit to a person because he
exercises a constitutional right. See id. TWR was wrong, according to the Court,
when it argued that Regan fit within the "Spieser-Perry model." See id.
80. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. "Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a
form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system." Id. Thus, Congress's
refusal to grant TWR a tax exemption for lobbying activities is akin to Congress's
refusal to pay for lobbying. See id.
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The Regan Court relied on its decision in Cammarano v. United
States8 l for the proposition that the First Amendment does not re-
quire Congress to subsidize lobbying.8 2 The withholding of funds
does not infringe on free expression because the First Amendment
does not require expenditure of governmental funds.8 3 Congress
can choose not to pay for TWR's lobbying because they have no
duty to do So. 8 4
Additionally, the Regan Court stated that "[t]he case would be
different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies
in such a way as to 'aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas."' 85
The Court enunciated this principle in response to TWR's argu-
ment that individual taxpayers were allowed tax exemptions under
the Code for contributions made to qualifying veterans' organiza-
tions.8 6 The Court, however, still concluded that the statute did not
violate the First Amendment because it found no indication that
Congress intended the statute to suppress expression of certain
ideas or that the statute actually had that effect.8 7
Less than a year after Regan, the Court considered FCC v.
League of Women Voters.8 8 League of Women Voters involved a challenge
by owners and operators of noncommercial educational broadcast-
ing stations against Section 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act,89
which prohibited any "noncommercial educational broadcasting
station that receives a grant" from "engag[ing] in editorializing."9 0
The Government, in seeking to uphold the provision, argued that
Regan permitted Congress, in the proper exercise of its spending
power, to determine that it "will not subsidize public broadcasting
81. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
82. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 546. Similarly in Cammarano, the Court upheld a
Treasury regulation that denied business expense deductions for lobbying activi-
ties. See Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513.
83. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 546.
84. See id. The Court explained: "[W]e again reject the 'notion that First
Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by
the State.'" Id. (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 515 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
85. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 (citing Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513).
86. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 54647. TWR had specifically argued that because
C I A -1,rs;s h thp lobbying activities of veterans' organizations, it was
obligated to subsidize the lobbying activities of § 501 (c) (3) organizations. See id.
87. See id. The Court concluded that the Internal Revenue sections at issue
did not use a suspect classification. See id. The distinction between veterans' orga-
nizations and other charitable organizations is not at all similar to distinctions that
are based on race or national origin. See id.
88. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
89. 47 U.S.C. § 399.
90. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 366 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 399).
13
Vignovic: National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley: The Propriety of Viewpo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
446 VI,_ANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL
station editorials."9 1 The Court explained that the spending power
would sustain the present statute if it were possible to limit the use
of federal funds to non-editorializing activity.9 2 The spending
power could not justify Section 399 because the statute barred
broadcasting stations from using private funds to finance editorial
activity without losing federal grants. 93
Although the Regan Court rejected any contention that the ap-
plicable statute regulated the content of speech, the Court reached
a different conclusion in League of Women Voters.9 4 The content-
based nature of Section 399 provided the Court with the basis for
applying strict scrutiny to the statute. 95 In applying strict scrutiny to
Section 399, the Court concluded that the complete ban on editori-
alizing was both under-inclusive and over-inclusive as a means of
avoiding government propagandizing and the use of public broad-
casting to further the partisan viewpoints of private interest
groups.96 The Court struck the statute down because the specific
interests underlying Section 399's ban on editorializing were not
sufficiently substantial "to justify the substantial abridgment of im-
portant journalistic freedoms which the First Amendment jealously
protects."
97
91. League of Women Voters, 469 U.S. at 399. The League of Women Voters Court
explained that in Regan, the Court found that Congress could reasonably refuse to
subsidize the lobbying of tax-exempt charitable organizations from using tax-de-
ductible contributions to support their lobbying efforts in the exercise of its spend-
ing power. See id.
92. See id. at 400. If such was possible, the statute would be valid under Regan
because "public broadcasting stations would be free, in the same way that the char-
itable organization in [Regan] was free, to make known its views on matters of
public importance through its nonfederally funded, editorializing affiliate without
losing federal grants for its noneditorializing broadcast activities." Id.
93. See League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 401.
94. See id. at 383. The Court reasoned that the law was content-based because
"[i] n order to determine whether a particular statement by station management
constitutes an 'editorial' proscribed by § 399, enforcement authorities must neces-
sarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed." Id.
95. See id at 380.
As a result of these [content] restrictions . . . the absolute freedom to
advocate one's own positions without also presenting opposing view-
points.., is denied to broadcasters. But as our cases attest, these restric-
tions have been upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is
narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest.
Id.
96. See id. at 398-99.
97. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402. The Court expressly stated that if
Congress were to adopt a revised version of § 399 which permitted noncommercial
educational broadcasting stations to establish affiliates to editorialize with
nonfederal funds, such a statute would be valid under Regan. See id. at 400.
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A few years later, the Court considered Arkansas Writers'Project,
Inc. v. Ragland. In Ragland, a publisher challenged as unconstitu-
tional a state sales tax levied against it, which taxed general interest
magazines but did not tax newspapers and religious, professional,
trade, and sports journals.98 The Court relied on League of Women
Voters to conclude that the tax was content-based because it re-
quired enforcement officials to "necessarily examine the content of
the message that is conveyed."99 As in League of Women Voters, the
Court applied strict scrutiny.100 The Court held that the tax was
invalid because Arkansas could not point to any compelling state
interest for the content-based taxation of certain magazines. 10'
In 1991, the Court considered whether another Arkansas tax
scheme violated the strictures of the First Amendment.10 2 In
Leathers v. Medlock, the Court examined whether the Arkansas Gross
Receipts Act,' 03 which imposed a generally applicable sales tax on
all tangible personal property and specified services, including
cable television and satellite services, but exempted all print media,
violated the First Amendment.10 4 In approaching the issue, the
Court reviewed several precedents, including Ragland, which stand
for the proposition that "differential taxation of First Amendment
speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens to suppress
the expression of particular ideas or viewpoint." 10 5 The Court reit-
erated its duty to apply strict scrutiny to the Arkansas tax if it did in
fact discriminate based on the content of the taxpayer speech in-
volved. 106 The Court stated that while a tax on a small number of
speakers runs the risk of "distort[ing] the market for ideas," there
was no danger present because the tax affected approximately one
98. See Ragland, 481 U.S. at 224. At the time of the challenge, the rate of tax
was four percent of gross receipts. See id.
99. Id. at 229. The Court stated that the tax is not exempt from First Amend-
ment constraints just "because it does not burden the expression of particular
views by specific magazines." Id. at 230. The Court reiterated the principle that
"the First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to
restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of an entire topic." Id.
100. See id. at 231. "Arkansas faces a heavy burden in attempting to defend its
content-based approach to taxation of magazines. In order to justify such differen-
tial taxation, the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achicvc that end." d.
101. See id. at 232.
102. See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 444.
103. Revenue Policy Statement 1988-1 (Mar. 10, 1988), reprinted in CCH
APutTAx REP. 69-415.
104. See Leathers, 499 U.S. at 442-43.
105. Id. at 447.
106. See id. "Absent a compelling justification, the government may not exer-
cise its taking power to single out the press." Id.
15
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hundred suppliers of cable television services. 10 7 Furthermore,
there was nothing in the statute that singled out mass media com-
munications based on whether a message was communicated by
satellites, newspapers or magazines.108 Thus, the Court found it un-
necessary to apply strict scrutiny, observing that the tax was based
on neither viewpoint nor content. 0 9
In 1991, the Court decided Rust v. Sullivan, which involved a
facial challenge to regulations promulgated under Title X of the
Public Health Service Act."10 Title X placed three principal condi-
tions on the grant of federal funds for Title X projects.1 ' Those
conditions prohibited federally funded family planning projects
from (1) engaging in abortion counseling or referring pregnant
women to abortion clinics; (2) taking part in activities that en-
courage, promote or advocate abortion; and (3) being anything less
than "physically and financially separate from abortion activi-
ties."1 12 The Title X grantees and doctors argued that the regula-
tions violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech.13
107. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448-49. Thus, the tax structure was not one that re-
sembled a penalty for particular ideas or speakers. See id. at 449.
108. See id at 449. There being nothing in the statute that referred to the
content of mass media communications, the Arkansas sales tax was not content-
based. See id.
109. See id. The Court held that because the tax presented "none of the diffi-
culties that have led us to strike down differential taxation in the past," the peti-
tioners had to point to some additional basis for concluding that the State violated
their First Amendment rights. See id. Petitioners argued that intermedia and in-
tramedia discrimination violated the First Amendment, even in the absence of in-
tent to suppress speech or any effect of the expression of ideas. See id. The Court,
after reviewing several precedents concluded that "differential taxation does not
implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger
of suppressing ideas." Id. at 453. Such was the case in Arkansas Writers' Prject, the
Court reasoned, but not here. See id.
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1970).
111. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 177-78. The Court in Rust stated:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult chal-
lenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact
that the regulations might operate unconstitutionally under some con-
ceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render them wholly invalid.
Id. at 183 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
112. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80.
113. See id. at 192. The Court summarized their argument as follows: "They
assert that the regulations violate the 'free speech rights of private health care
organizations that receive Title X funds, of their staff, and their patients' by imper-
missibly imposing 'viewpoint-discriminatory conditions on government subsidies'
and thus penalize speech funded with non-Title X monies.'" Id. (citing Brief for
Petitioners at 13, 14, 24). Additionally, in Rust, the challengers relied on the
Court's previous decision in Regan for the proposition that because "Title X con-
tinues to fund speech ancillary to pregnancy testing in a manner that is not even-
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Their challenge, however, was unsuccessful.' 1 4 The Court held
that the prohibition on abortion-related speech was unquestionably
constitutional." 5 The Court stated that "[t]he Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to en-
courage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternative program which
seeks to deal with the problem in another way." 16 The Court fur-
ther reasoned that such a decision did not constitute viewpoint dis-
crimination because "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right." 1 7 The
Court distinguished Ragland, in which the tax was held to be dis-
criminatory and on which the challengers in Rust relied.118 The
Court stated: "We have here not the case of a general law singling
out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but a case of
the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech, which
are specifically excluded from the scope of the project funded."1 19
The Court also rejected the contention that the restrictions on
abortion-related speech subsidization were impermissible because
they were an "unconstitutional condition."120 The Court relied on
handed with respect to views and information about abortion, it invidiously
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint" and thus, was unlawfully "ai[ming] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas." Id. (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548).
114. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
115. See id. at 192. The Court reiterated its decision in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1979), a case in which it upheld a state welfare regulation under which Medi-
caid recipients received payments for childbirth related services, but not for non-
therapeutic abortions. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192. In rejecting the claim that
unequal subsidization amounted to a violation of the Constitution, the Court held
"that the government may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abor-
tion, and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.'" Id. at
193. Thus, in Rust, the government was simply exercising its authority under
Maher. See id.
116. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. The Court stated that "[t]here is a difference be-
tween direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Id. (citing Maher, 432
U.S. at 475.
117. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 549). The Title X pro-
gram was not designed for prenatal care, but to encourage family planning. See
Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. Therefore, it is clear under the statute that a doctor em-
ployed by the project may be prohibited from counseling abortion or referring for
abortion because such activities are outsideuo -- e projects scope, not . anse the
Government is trying to suppress "a dangerous idea." See id. at 193-94.
118. See id. at 194. The Court explained that the tax in Ragland was held to be
unconstitutional because it discriminated based on the content of speech and
targeted a small group within the press. See id.
119. Id. at 194.
120. See id. at 196. The Title X grantees and doctors relied on Perry v. Sinder-
man, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), for the contention that "even though the government
may deny a... benefit for any number of reasons.... [i]t may not deny a benefit
17
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the dichotomy between its decisions in League of Women Voters and
Regan to explain that an unconstitutional condition will only exist
when there is a total deprivation of a constitutional right.121 Under
the law in League of Women Voters, the recipient of federal funds was
"barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its editorial
activity," whereas under the law in Regan, the recipient of federal
money remained free to receive deductions for non-lobbying activ-
ity and at the same time still pursue lobbying efforts without govern-
mental contributions. 122 This choice in Regan led the Court to
conclude that Congress had "not infringed on any First Amend-
ment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity; it has simply
chosen not to pay for appellee's lobbying."123 In keeping with its
teachings in Regan and League of Women Voters, the Rust Court ex-
plained that Congress had not denied Title X grantees the right to
engage in abortion related activities, but had only required that the
grantee "engage in abortion-related activity separately from activity
receiving federal funding." 124
The Court's decision in Rust, as well as decisions in prior cases
such as Regan and Taxation Without Representation suggest the exist-
ence of several essential principles in the jurisprudence of govern-
ment subsidies and the First Amendment. First, the government
can impose conditions on the funding of expression as long as
those conditions leave open adequate alternative channels whereby
the recipient of the funds can, without losing funding already
granted, also engage in speech that does not qualify for funding. A
second emerging principle is that conditions on funding must not
discriminate on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint.
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests - espe-
cially, his interest in freedom of speech." Id. (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 597).
121. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-98. The Court stated that in contrast to the
present case, "unconstitutional condition" cases involve situations in which the
government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy, thus denying
the recipient any opportunity to engage in the protected conduct outside of the
scope of the federally funded program, rather than on a particular program or
service. See id. at 197.
122. Id. at 197-98.
123. Id. at 198.
124. Id. The Court stated that the doctor could make it clear to patients that
advice regarding abortion is beyond the scope of the program. See id. at 200. The
Court concluded the First Amendment issue by stating that "[ifn these circum-
stances, the general rule that the Government may choose not to subsidize speech
applies with full force." Id.
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C. The Court's Most Recent Pronouncement: Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Regents of the University of Virginia
One of the most recent decisions involving the First Amend-
ment's implications for governmental subsidization of speech is Ro-
senberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia.'25 In
Rosenberger, a Christian student group called Wide Awake Produc-
tions (WAP) submitted a request to the University of Virginia's
Student Activities Fund (SAF) for the costs of printing its newspa-
per. 126 The SAF's purpose was to fund "a broad range of extracur-
ricular student activities that 'are related to the educational
purpose of the University.' "127 Certain University Guidelines, how-
ever, which governed the SAF, provided that certain activities of
qualifying student organizations were not reimbursable. 128 Among
the activities excluded from reimbursement by the SAF were reli-
gious, political, and philanthropic activities. 129 The Appropriations
Committee refused to reimburse the group for the costs of printing
its paper because it determined that WAP was a religious activity
under the Guidelines and that the newspaper "promoted or mani-
fested a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality.'30
The Court observed that the principles governing the legiti-
macy of content-based laws also provide the "framework forbidding
the State from exercising viewpoint discrimination, even when the
limited public forum is one of its own creation." 13 While the pur-
125. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
126. See id. at 827. Before a student group is eligible to submit bills to the SAF
for payment, it must become a "Contracted Independent Organization" (CIO).
See id. at 823. A group may become a CIO if the majority of its members are stu-
dents, its managing officers are fulltime students, and it complies with certain pro-
cedural requirements. See id. Under the University Guidelines, not all CIO's can
submit disbursement requests to the SAF. See id. at 824.
127. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824.
128. See id. at 824-25.
129. See id. at 825. These activities were excluded because they would jeop-
ardize the University's tax exempt status. See id. The only political activities ex-
empted from reimbursement by the SAF were electioneering and lobbying. See id.
The Guidelines make it clear that the restrictions on the funding of political activi-
ties are not meant "to preclude funding of any otherwise eligible student organiza-
tion which ... espouses particular positions or ideological vie~wpoints, including
those that may be unpopular or are not generally accepted." Id. at 825 (citing
University Guidelines). By contrast, a religious activity is an activity that "primarily
promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."
Id. (citing University Guidelines) (emphasis added).
130. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827.
131. Id. at 829. Public forums are government-owned properties that the gov-
ernment is constitutionally obligated to make available for speech, such as side-
walks and parks. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, at 927. The following are the
19
Vignovic: National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley: The Propriety of Viewpo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
452 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JoURNAL
pose of a forum may justify the State in acting to preserve its limits,
the State may neither prohibit speech where the distinction is un-
reasonable in light of its purpose nor discriminate against speech
on the basis of viewpoint.132 Viewpoint discrimination is presumed
to be impermissible.' 3
3
The Court noted that the SAF qualified as a public forum, al-
beit in a "metaphysical" rather than in a "spatial or geographic"
sense, and thus applied the foregoing principles.13 4 The Court con-
cluded that the University policy amounted to viewpoint discrimina-
tion because it did not exclude religion as a subject matter but
instead disfavored student publications with religious editorial view-
points.13 5 It did not matter that the unfunded publications such as
WAP discussed subjects that were otherwise within the approved
category of publications.13 6
The University cited the Court's decisions in Rust and Regan to
support the proposition that the State has substantial discretion to
determine how to distribute scarce resources and accomplish its
mission.' 37 The Court, however, rejected this argument, and distin-
guished Rust.138 In Rust, the government did not create a program
to foster private speech but instead used private speakers to convey
principles that have been recognized by the Court regarding the regulation of
speech in public forums:
First, the regulation must be content neutral unless the content restric-
tion is justified by strict scrutiny. Second, it must be a reasonable time,
place, or manner restriction that serves an important government interest
and leaves open adequate alternative places for speech. Third, a licens-
ing or permit system for the use of public forums must serve an important
purpose, give clear criteria to the licensing authority that leaves almost no
discretion, and provide procedural safeguards such as a requirement or
prompt determination of license requests and judicial review of license
denials.
Id.
132. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
133. See id. at 830. The Court has observed a distinction between content
discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of the limited
forum, and viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed to be impermissible when
aimed at speech otherwise within the forum's limitations. See id. at 829-30. This
observation had been adhered to when determining whether the exclusion of a
class of speech from a public forum is a legitimate effort at preserving the limits of
the forum. See id.
134. See id. at 830.
135. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 832. The University relied on these authorities in arguing that
content-based funding decisions are lawful and inevitable. See id. at 833.
138. See id. In Rust, the Court held that the government's prohibition on
abortion-related advice when federal funds were disbursed for family planning
counseling was constitutional. See id. For a discussion of Rust, see supra notes 110-
24 and accompanying text.
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information on its own program.13 9 When the government appro-
priates public funds to promote its own policy, it is entitled to say
what it wants. 140 The government can also take legitimate and ap-
propriate steps to protect its own message when the government
enlists private entities to convey its message. 141 It does not follow,
however, that when the University spends its own funds to en-
courage a diversity of views, viewpoint restrictions are proper. 142
The Court also distinguished its holding in Regan.143 Although
the Court acknowledged, in Regan, that the Government need not
subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights, the Court also af-
firmed the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the context of
governmental funding.144 Additionally, Regan relied on a distinc-
tion based on preferential treatment of certain speakers and not on
the content or messages of speech.1 45 In contrast, the University's
regulation carried no similarly legitimate distinction; instead, a
speech-based restriction was the University's sole rationale. 146
Additionally, scarce funding could not justify the viewpoint-
based decisions. 147 The Court identified several dangers in al-
lowing the government to engage in viewpoint discrimination that
is otherwise impermissible:
The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the
power to examine publications to determine whether or
not they are based on some ultimate idea and if so for the
139. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 834.
143. See id. For a discussion of the Court's holding in Regan, see supra notes
77-89 and accompanying text.
144. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. In Regan, the Court stated that "the case
would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in
such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.'" Id. (citing Regan,
461 U.S. at 548).
145. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
146. See id. at 834. According to the Court, there was a clear distinction be-
tween the University's message and the private speech of students. See id. The
University has, in fact, ensured this distinction by stating in the CIO agreement
that the student groups eligible for payment from the SAF are not thc University's
agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility. See id. at 834-35.
The University has offered to pay third-party contractors on behalf of speakers who
convey their own messages and may not, in turn, silence only select viewpoints. See
id. at 835.
147. See id. at 835. The Court stated that "the underlying premise that the
University could discriminate based on viewpoint if demand for space exceeded its
availability is wrong as well. The government cannot justify viewpoint discrimina-
tion among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity." Id.
453
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State to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger
is to speech from the chilling of individual thought and
expression. 48
Thus, the Court concluded that the University's provision
amounted to a viewpoint-based restriction that unconstitutionally
abridged WAP's freedom of speech. 149
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Court
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Finley, addressed
two distinct constitutional challenges to Section 954(d) (1).150 First,
the Court addressed the assertion that Section 954(d)(1) is view-
point-based, and thus at odds with the First Amendment. 5 1 Sec-
ond, the Court considered the argument that the provision is vague
and therefore unconstitutional under the First and Fifth
Amendments. 15 2
Before addressing the merits of the First Amendment chal-
lenge, the Court noted the "heavy burden" the respondents con-
fronted in advancing their facial constitutional challenge.1 53 The
Court further articulated the artists' burden of proof: "To prevail,
respondents must demonstrate a substantial risk that application of
the provision will lead to the suppression of speech." 154
The Court then addressed the substance of the parties' con-
flicting arguments. While the respondents argued that Section
954 (d) (1) is "a paradigmatic example of viewpoint discrimination"
because it constrains the NEA from funding entire categories of ex-
pression, the NEA argued the provision is "merely horatory" and
"stops well short of an absolute restriction."1 55 The Court adopted
the latter view: "Section 954(d) (1) adds 'considerations' to the
grant-making process; it does not preclude awards to projects that
148. Id. The Court observed that the danger of viewpoint discrimination is
"especially real" in the context of the University, because the State "acts against a
background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our
intellectual and philosophic tradition." Id.
149. See id. at 837.
150. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 572-73.
151. See id. at 580.
152. See id. at 588.
153. Id. at 580. (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 183).
154. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 580. "Facial invalidation... 'has been employed by
this Court sparingly and only as a last resort.'" Id. (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
155. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 580.
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might be deemed 'indecent' or 'disrespectful,' nor place conditions
on grants, or even specify that those factors must be given any par-
ticular weight in reviewing an application." 156 The Court demon-
strated the clarity of this non-categorical characterization by
juxtaposing Section 954(d) (1) against Section 954(d) (2), a provi-
sion in which Congress intended to prohibit the funding of
obscenity. 157
In further support of constitutionality, the Court observed that
Section 954(d) (1) was proposed as a compromise to amendments
that were aimed at eliminating the NEA's funding or its grant-mak-
ing authority.15 8 Such legislative intent, as evidenced by comments
made by various members of Congress, as well as 954(d) (1)'s advi-
sory language, dissuaded the Court from finding that the provision
would be used to discriminate against various viewpoints. 159 As
R.A. V v. St. Paul illustrates, to be facially unconstitutional, legisla-
tion must present dangers that are more evident and more substan-
tial than the present case. 160 In R.A.V., the "provision set forth a
clear penalty, proscribed views on particular 'disfavored subjects,'
and suppressed 'distinctive idea[s], conveyed by a distinctive
message.'"161 In contrast, the decency and respect criteria do not
expressly silence speakers. 162
In addition, the Court rejected respondents' argument that the
criteria in Section 954(d) (1) are subjective enough to be used by
the agency to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.163 According
to the Court, the diversity of possible interpretations of the criteria
156. Id. at 580-81. The Court enumerated, as support for this interpretation,
the NEA's method of implementing § 954(d) (1) through the use of advisory
panels consisting of members of various backgrounds and with different view-
points. See id at 581. The Court refused to consider whether such a formulation is
a reasonable reading of the statute by the NEA. See id.
157. See id. at 581. Section 954(d) (2) states that "[o] bscenity is without artis-
tic merit, is not protected speech, and shall not be funded." Id. (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 954(d) (2)). Thus, when Congress has intended to restrict the NEA, it has
done so clearly. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 581.
158. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 581.
159. See id. at 581-82. One sponsor, before the vote on § 954(d) (1), said: "If
we have done one important thing in this amendment, it is this. We have main-
tained the integrity of freedom of expression in the United States." Id. at 582
(citing 136 Cong. Rec. 28626, 28674 (1990)).
160. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 582. In RA.V, the Court struck down on its face
a municipal ordinance that made it a crime to place a symbol on private or public
property "which one knows ... arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender." Id. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
380).
161. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 582 (citing RA.V., 505 U.S. at 391).
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and the fact that the statute merely recommends that finding deci-
sion-makers consider those criteria, make it unlikely, as a practical
matter, that Section 954(d) (1) would suppress certain view-
points. 64 The Court, furthermore, expressed reluctance to strike
down the statute on the basis of hypothetical situations. 6 5
The Court enumerated several constitutionally permissible
constructions of the "decency" prong of Section 954(d) (1) and its
reference to "respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the Ameri-
can public."'166 The Court recognized that such legitimate applica-
tions were not enough, alone, to sustain the statute, but concluded
that in other applications Section 954(d) (1) will not tend to sup-
press free speech. 167 Not only may the NEA decide to fund projects
for any variety of reasons, the Court stated, but the very nature of
arts funding forces the NEA to consider the content of a project.168
The Court next revisited its decision in Rosenberger.'69 The
Court distinguished Rosenberger because of the competitive process
by which the NEA distributes grants. 170 The NEA does not "indis-
criminately 'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,"'
but instead makes "aesthetic judgments" to determine what art
meets "the inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold" for
support.171 Such considerations set the NEA grant-making process
apart from the subsidy in Rosenberger, which was available to all stu-
dent organizations related to the educational purpose of the
University. 172
164. See id. The criteria could not, for example, punish viewpoints in the
funding of symphony orchestras, for "one could hardly anticipate how 'decency' or
'respect' would bear" on such applications. Id.
165. See id. at 584.
166. Id. The NEA's activities include children's festivals and museums, art
education, at-risk youth projects, and artists in schools. See id. It is an established
principle that decency can be considered when "educational suitability" is at issue.
Id. (citing Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 871 (1982)). As for the "diverse beliefs and values of the American pub-
lic" prong, one purpose of the NEA is to preserve the nation's "multicultural artis-
tic heritage," and it is not disputed that the criteria are permissibly applied when
used to evaluate a project with an intended audience. Id. at 585 (citing 20 U.S.C.
§ 951 (10)).
167. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 585.
168. See id. With such limited resources, the NEA must deny the majority of
the grant applications it receives and thereby deny funds to speech that is constitu-
tionally protected. See id.
169. See id. at 586. For a discussion of Rosenberger, see supra notes 125-49 and
accompanying text.
170. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 586.
171. Id.
172. Id. See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 386 (1993) (making objective decisions to permit access to school
[Vol. 6: p. 433
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After concluding that Section 954(d) (1) did not itself consti-
tute viewpoint discrimination, the Court examined the constitution-
ality of the provision in relation to its role in the government
subsidy scheme. 173 The Court stated that "[i]f the NEA were to lev-
erage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria
into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a
different case." 174 The Court, however, elected to uphold the provi-
sion as constitutional until the NEA applies Section 954(d) (1) in a
manner that raises concern about viewpoint discrimination. 175
The Court expanded on the role of provisions like Section
954(d) (1) in the context of a governmental subsidy scheme. 176
While recognizing the First Amendment's application to govern-
ment subsidies, the Court stressed the wide latitude given to Con-
gress to set spending priorities and the government's ability to
distribute competitive funding.177 The Court quoted Rust v. Sulli-
van for the proposition that such latitude allows Congress to "selec-
tively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alter-
native program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way."178 Accordingly, the NEA's declaration of purpose provides
that "arts funding should 'contribute to public support and confi-
dence in the use of taxpayer funds .... ,-1179 By acting with such a
purpose, the Government has merely chosen to fund one activity
over another and has not discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint. 80
auditorium); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 148 n.1 (1946) (making
second class mailing privileges available to "all newspapers and other periodical
publications").
173. See Finley I, 524 U.S. at 587.
174. Id. The Court stated that "even in the provision of subsidies, the Govern-
ment may not 'ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas . . .'" Id. (citing
Regan, 461 U.S. at 550). "[I]f a subsidy were 'manipulated' to have a 'coercive
effect,' then relief could be appropriate." Finley I1, 524 U.S. at 587 (citing Ragland,
481 U.S. at 237 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
175. See Finley 1, 524 U.S. at 587.
176. See id. at 587-88. This portion of the opinion was not joined by Justice
Ginsburg. See id. at 572.
177. See id. at 587-88. "[A. jlhougli the "ist Amendment cerLauaiy has applica-
tion in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may allocate competitive
funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation
of speech or a criminal penalty at stake." Id. at 588. Such power is only limited by
the government's inability to infringe on other constitutional rights during this
process. See id. at 588.
178. Id. (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 193).
179. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 588 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 951(5)).
180. See Finley I, 524 U.S. at 588.
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Having concluded that Section 954(d) (1) does not constitute
viewpoint discrimination and is therefore valid under the First
Amendment, the Court next considered the vagueness chal-
lenge.181 In holding that the lower courts erred by finding Section
954(d) (1) unconstitutionally vague, the Court again observed that
the provision involves a government subsidy.18 2 The Court ob-
served that the unclear terms of the provision would raise substan-
tial vagueness concerns if they appeared in a criminal statute or
regulatory scheme. 183 The Court held that "when the Government
is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of
imprecision are not constitutionally severe."18 4 Having so con-
cluded, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
holding that Section 954(d) (1) does not, on its face, infringe on
First or Fifth Amendment rights. 185
B. The Concurrence
In concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that the Court must evalu-
ate Section 954(d) (1) as it was written. 18 6 Applying such an evalua-
tion, Justice Scalia reached two conclusions: first, that Section
954(d) (1) establishes both content-based and viewpoint-based re-
strictions; and second, that such restrictions are nonetheless
constitutional. 187
In concluding that Section 954(d) (1) constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination, Justice Scalia focused on the language of Section
954(d) (1).188 Its language makes clear that the decency and re-
spect factors are to be considered in evaluating all applications. 89
While the effect of such a construction does not impose a categori-
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 589.
184. Id. Additionally, the Court observed that "[i]n the context of selective
subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity," and "[tlo
accept respondents' vagueness argument would be to call into question the consti-
tutionality of these valuable government programs and countless others like
them." Id. at 589.
185. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 590.
186. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
187. See id.
188. Id. at 591. "The law at issue in this case is to be found in the text of
§ 954(d) (1) ... [a]nd that law unquestionably disfavors - discriminates against -
indecency and disrespect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American peo-
ple." Id. at 595.
189. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 592. (Scalia, J., concurring). ("The statute requires
the decency and respect factors to be considered in evaluating - not for example,just those applications relating to educational programs, ... or intended for a
particular audience.").
[Vol. 6: p. 433
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cal requirement, Section 954(d) (1) is nonetheless discrimina-
tory.190 "To the extent a particular applicant exhibits disrespect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public or fails to
comport with general standards of decency, the likelihood that he
will receive a grant diminishes."1 91 Thus, the language "taken into
consideration" has the effect of favoring applications that display
decency and respect and disfavoring those applications that do
not.192 For Justice Scalia, this undoubtedly constitutes viewpoint
consideration. 193
The constitutionality of Section 954(d) (1) was not redeemed
the elusive nature of the decency and respect factors.194 Similarly,
the political context surrounding the adoption of the clause did not
affect the meaning or constitutionality of Section 954(d) (1), as the
Court suggests. 195 In fact, according to Justice Scalia, the Court
should not have considered the legislative history at all. 19 6
Having concluded that Section 954(d) (1) constitutes viewpoint
discrimination, Justice Scalia sought to demonstrate that the exist-
ence of such a provision in a governmental subsidy scheme does
not violate the Constitution. 197 The First Amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech." 198 In enacting Section 954(d) (1), Congress did not
abridge speech because "[t] hose who wish to create indecent and
disrespectful art are as unconstrained now as they were before the
enactment of this statute."1 99 The concurrence cites several author-
ities for the proposition that the mere deprivation of taxpayer sub-
sidy cannot be equated with measures that are designed to suppress
"dangerous ideas." 200 Justice Scalia proposed that even if one ac-
cepted the argument that a threat of rejection by the only possible
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 593.
193. See id.
194. See Finely II, 524 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. See id. at 594. Conversely, if one does look at the legislative history of
§ 954(d) (1), it becomes evident that the provision "was prompted by, and directed
at, the public funding of such offensive productions as Serrano's 'Piss Christ,' and
Mapplethorpe's show of lurid homoerntic nhotographs." Id. Thus, if the legisla-
tive history shows anything, it shows that the statute was meant to discriminate
against such productions. See id.
196. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 595.
198. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I).
199. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 596. (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 550 (quoting Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1958), in turn quoting Spieser, 357 U.S. at 519)).
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source of free money would amount to coercion and hence an
abridgement of one's freedom of speech, it would not apply here
because the NEA is not the only source of funding for art.201 Thus,
Justice Scalia asserts that the government may choose to fund only
projects it believes to be in the public interest without abridging
speech. 202
Furthermore, Section 954(d) (1) and nearly every other fund-
ing enactment passed by Congress are constitutional because " [t] he
Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in
the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program."203 Just as it is constitutional for Congress to fund the
NEA despite views to the contrary, it is likewise constitutional for
Congress to favor decency and respect over other views.20 4 For Jus-
tice Scalia, this is true because such preferential treatment does not
violate an individual's First Amendment rights. 20
5
Like the majority, Justice Scalia addressed respondents' reli-
ance on Rosenberger.206 Justice Scalia disagreed with the artists' argu-
ment that under Rosenberger, "viewpoint-based discrimination is
impermissible unless the government is the speaker or the govern-
ment is 'disburs[ing] public funds to private entities to convey a
governmental message. "' 207 ForJustice Scalia, not only is it the gov-
ernment'sjob to favor and disfavor viewpoints, but it does not mat-
ter whether government officials do so "directly," "advocat[e] it
officially," or "giv[e] money to others who achieve or advocate
it."20 8 Rosenberger, Justice Scalia explained, turned on the govern-
ment's establishment of a limited public forum, to which the NEA's
highly selective grant-making process simply does not compare.20 9
Thus, Justice Scalia would have held that the government may allo-
cate competitive and noncompetitive funding at its pleasure be-
201. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 597 (Scalia, J., concurring).
202. See id.
203. Id. (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 193).
204. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 597-98 (Scalia, J., concurring). "[T]he NEA itself
is nothing less than an institutionalized discrimination against" the point of view
once espoused by John Adams that "the fine arts were like germs that infected
healthy constitutions." Id. at 597 (citingJ. ELis, AYTER THE REVOLUTION: PROFILES
OF EARLY AMERICAN CULTURE 36 (1979)).
205. See Finely II, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).
206. See id.
207. Id. (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833).
208. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).
209. See id. at 599.
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cause the First Amendment does not impose limitations on
governmental funding.210
C. The Dissent
Justice Souter was the only member of the Court who dissented
in Finley I1.211 Like the members of the majority and concurrence,
Justice Souter considered whether Section 954(d) (1) constitutes
viewpoint discrimination and what the effect such a characteriza-
tion has on governmental subsidization.21 2 Additionally, Justice
Souter discussed the appropriate standard of review.213 In essence,
Justice Souter determined the following: first, Section 954(d) (1) is
viewpoint based; second, governmental subsidization of art is sub-
ject to First Amendment constraints; and finally, Section 954(d) (1)
is facially unconstitutional because it is substantially overbroad.2 14
Before beginning his analysis, Justice Souter stated that "the
First Amendment means that the government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message or its ideas."215 Not only
does this principle apply to affirmative efforts at suppression of
speech, but it applies to disqualification of governmental favors as
well.2 1 6 Artistic expression is a category of speech protected from
viewpoint discrimination. 217
Because this concept of "governmental viewpoint neutrality"
applies in the present context, the primary inquiry is "whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disa-
greement with the message it conveys. The government's purpose
is the controlling consideration."21 8 Section 954(d) is, on its face,
viewpoint based, Justice Souter observed.21 9 Remarks made by vari-
ous congressional supporters of Section 954(d) (1) indicate that
210. See id. In addressing respondents' vagueness challenge, Justice Scalia
similarly determined that the vagueness doctrine has no application to governmen-
tal funding. See id. at 599-600.
211. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 560 (Souter, J., dissenting).
212. See id. at 600-16.
213. See id. at 617-22.
214. See id. at 622.
215. Id. at 601 (citing Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95).
216. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 601 (Souter, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 602.
218. Id. at 603 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)).
219. See Finley I 524 U.S. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Congress included the decency and respect criteria to prevent fund-
ing for art that conveys an offensive message. 220
Justice Souter examined three attempts by the Court to explain
why Section 954(d) (1) does not constitute viewpoint discrimina-
tion.221 First, Justice Souter considered the Court's statement that
the phrase "general standards of decency and respect for the di-
verse beliefs and values of the American public" is susceptible to
various interpretations, and thus, does not constitute viewpoint dis-
crimination.222 Justice Souter disagreed and asserted that, rather,
restrictions based on decency are viewpoint-based because "they re-
quire discrimination on the basis of conformity with mainstream
mores."223 Justice Souter also dismissed the counter-argument that
decency criteria only limit the "mode, form, or style" of artwork,
and not its underlying point of view. 224 For Justice Souter, the na-
ture of artistic expression and viewpoints conveyed by such expres-
sion are inextricably linked; thus, he worried that enforcement of
the criteria would "[s]tarve the mode," and thereby "starve the
message."225 The statute is viewpoint discrimination because it dis-
favors art that does not reflect the ideology, opinion, or convictions
of many Americans. 226
Justice Souter next examined the Court's observation that the
NEA may comply with Section 954(d) by staffing advisory panels
with members of diverse backgrounds. 227 The statutory language
and legislative history, Justice Souter pointed out, are at odds with
such a reading.228 Assuming that the statute could be satisfied by
the use of diverse panels, "that would merely mean that selection
for decency and respect would occur derivatively through the incli-
nations of the panel members, instead of directly through the in-
tentional application of the criteria; at the end of the day, the
220. See id. at 603-604. The dissent cited a comment made by the proviso's
author that the bill "add [s] to the criteria of artistic excellence and artistic merit, a
shell, a screen, a viewpoint that must be constantly taken into account." Id. at 604
(citing 136 CONG. REc. 28631 (1990)).
221. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 605-610 (Souter, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 605.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 39-41).
225. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 606 (Souter, J., dissenting).
226. See id.
227. See id at 607.
228. See id.
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proviso would still serve its purpose to screen out offending artistic
works."2 29 For Justice Souter, this outcome is unconstitutional.
230
Finally, Justice Souter examined the Court's contention that
the provision merely "adds 'considerations' to the grant-making
process; it does not preclude awards .... place conditions on grants,
... or even specify that those factors must be given any particular
weight."23' Justice Souter finds this reading of the statute unfair in
light of the legislative history.2 32 He concluded that, even if he
could agree that the statute only mandated consideration, the stat-
ute would still be unconstitutional because the First Amendment
does not allow the government to consider viewpoint in deciding
whether to subsidize the speech of private citizens.233
Having determined that the provision constitutes viewpoint
discrimination, Justice Souter next examined whether placement of
the provision in the context of a governmental subsidization
scheme enables the provision to escape First Amendment require-
ments.23 4 Justice Souter noted that, when the government assumes
the role of "government-as-speaker" or "government-as-buyer," it
can legitimately engage in viewpoint discrimination. 235 The gov-
ernment does not speak through the art subsidized by the NEA,
however. Nor does it buy anything for itself.23 6 Rather, by subsi-
dizing artistic expression the government acts as a patron.237 The
problem for Justice Souter was that the government-as-patron role
does not fit into the already existing categories in which the govern-
229. Id. at 608.
230. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 609.
232. See id. "[TIhere was nothing naive about the Representative who said he
voted for the bill because it does 'not tolerate wasting Federal funds for sexually
explicit photographs [or] sacrilegious works.'" Id. (citing 136 CONG. Rrc. 28676
(1990)).
233. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 610 (Souter, J., dissenting).
234. See id. Justice Souter observes that the Court and the concurrence as-
sume that "whether or not the statute mandates viewpoint discrimination, there is
no constitutional issue here because government art subsidies fall within a zone of
activity free from First Amendment restraints." Id.
235. Id. at 612. For example:
[I]f the Food and Drug Administration launches an advertising campaign
on the subject of smoking, [it is asuciang the role of government-as.
speaker and] it may condemn the habit without also having to show a
cowboy taking a puff on the opposite page; and if the Secretary of De-
fense wishes to buy a portrait to decorate the Pentagon, [he is acting in
the role of government-as-buyer and] he is free to prefer George Wash-
ington over George the Third.
Id. at 611.
236. See id. at 611.
237. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ment can engage in viewpoint discrimination, but rather "falls em-
barrassingly on the wrong side of the line between government as a
buyer or speaker and government as a regulator of private
speech." 238
Justice Souter listed several precedents, the most recent of
which is Rosenberger, to demonstrate that the government may not
discriminate in its allocation of subsidies to suppress ideas unless
the government is itself acting as a buyer or speaker.239 Unlike the
majority and concurrence, Justice Souter concluded that Rosenberger
governs this case.2 40 Justice Souter reads Rosenberger to hold that
the "government may not act on viewpoint when it 'does not itself
speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead
funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.' ",241
Like the student activities fund in Rosenberger, Congress created the
NEA to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. 242
Thus, as long as Congress decides to subsidize artistic endeavors
expansively through the NEA, it cannot base funding decisions on
viewpoint popularity without violating the First Amendment rule ar-
ticulated in Rosenberger.243
Justice Souter confronted the majority's argument that Rosen-
berger is distinguishable on the basis that the student activities funds
in Rosenberger were obtainable by most applicants, whereas NEA
funds are distributed selectively and competitively to only a few.2 44
Justice Souter stated that the Court in Rosenberger held that the gov-
ernment cannot rely on scarcity to justify viewpoint discrimination
238. Id. at 612. The Government had apparently argued that the Court
should recognize a new category of speech liberated from First Amendment stric-
tures "by analogy" to those already accepted. Id. Justice Souter rejected this pro-
posal because "the Government has offered nothing to justify recognition of a new
exempt category." Id. at 612.
239. See id. at 612-13. (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548). Rosenberger held that the
University of Virginia could not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in under-
writing the speech of student-run publications. See id. at 613.
240. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting).
241. See id.
242. See id. To support this contention,Justice Souter cited several other pro-
visions of the NEA funding statute and its legislative history. See id. Specifically,
Souter stated that "Congress brought the NEA into being to help all Americans
'achieve a better analysis of the present, and a better view of the future.'" Id.
(citing 20 U.S.C. § 951(d) (3)). Moreover, Souter noted that "[t ] he NEA's purpose
is to 'support new ideas' and 'to help create and sustain ... a climate encouraging
freedom of thought, imagination, and inquiry.' " Id. (citing 20 U.S.C.
§§ 951(d)(7),(10)). The legislative history states that "[t]he intent of this act
should be the encouragement of free inquiry and expression." Id. (citing S. Rep.
No. 89-300, at 4 (1965).
243. See Finely II, 524 U.S. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting).
244. See id. at 614.
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among private speakers. 245 While the Court in Finley II describes
NEA funding in terms of competition, such an attempt cannot work
because "[c] ompetition implies scarcity, without which there is no
exclusive prize to compete for. '246 Thus, the fact that NEA funding
is competitive does not justify choices made on the basis of
viewpoint.247
Finally, the dissent argues that Section 954(d) (1) is unconstitu-
tional on its face under the overbreadth doctrine.2 48 Justice Souter
recognized, as did the Court, that facial challenges to legislation are
disfavored. 249 Accordingly, the Court found the provision constitu-
tional on its face, in part because there are a number of constitu-
tional applications of the provision. 250 However, Justice Souter
noted that the overbreadth doctrine, which renders a statute that is
invalid in any of its applications invalid in all of its applications, is
an exception to this rule.251 The law should be invalidated for over-
breadth if it has a number of impermissible applications.252 In Jus-
tice Souter's opinion, the few permissible applications offered by
the Court do not alter his conclusion that the statute has a number
of impermissible applications, thus rendering Section 954(d) (1)
facially invalid. 253
Bolstering his view of the applicability of the overbreadth doc-
trine is the likelihood that speech will be chilled. 254 Justice Souter
observed that, because of Section 954(d) (1), artists will edit their
funding applications to avoid anything likely to offend, or refrain
245. See id. (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835).
246. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 614 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 614-15.
248. See id. at 617.
249. See id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223 (1990)). "A facial
challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Justice Souter observed that the Court freely conceded that
such a rule "does not limit challenges brought under the First Amendment's
speech clause." Id. at 617.
250. SeeFinley II, 524 U.S. at 617 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted
that the Court conceded that the valid applications enumerated by them "would
not alone be sufficient to sustain the statute." Id. at 618. The Court "upholds the
statute because it is not 'peisuaded that, in oh.r ... ,-alr-tonq, the language of
§ 954(d) (1) itself will give rise to the suppression of protected expression.'" Id. at
620 n.15. Justice Souter invokes the Court's statements to point out that the
Court's arguments for upholding the statute have already been refuted by him. See
id.
251. See id. at 618.
252. See id. at 619.
253. See id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982)).
254. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 621 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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from applying for NEA grants altogether. 255 Furthermore, the im-
pact felt by those "chilled" will be magnified because NEA grants
are often matched by funds from private donors.256 For these rea-




The Court's conclusion that Section 954(d) (1) is merely advi-
sory and not impermissibly viewpoint-based on its face is significant
because it allows the Court to avoid precisely defining First Amend-
ment restrictions on government funding for the arts. That this
conclusion results in an ambiguity, however, is evidenced by the
Court's reasoning that any viewpoint-based decisions in funding
would receive consideration by the Court,258 but at the same time
the government has "wide latitude to set spending priorities."25 9
This analysis focuses, first, on the Court's reasoning under the First
Amendment that the decency clause is not viewpoint-based, and
then examines the Court's pronouncements about the meaning of
viewpoint discrimination in the context of government subsidies. 26
A. Section 954(d) (1) Does Not Constitute
Viewpoint Discrimination
Although the Court did not explicitly say so in such terms, it
evaluated the facial challenge to Section 954(d) (1) under the over-
breadth doctrine.261 Thus, respondents did not have to prove, as
with most facial challenges, that no constitutional applications of
255. See id.
256. See id. "[M]ost non-federal funding sources regard the NEA award as an
imprimatur that signifies the recipient's artistic merit and value. NEA grants lend
prestige and legitimacy to projects and are therefore critical to the ability of artists
and companies to attract non-federal funding sources." Id. at 2194 (quoting Bella
Lewitsky Dance Foundation v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp 774, 783 (C.D. Cal.
1991)).
257. SeeFinley II, 524 U.S. at 622 (SouterJ., dissenting). Justice Souter did not
address respondents' vagueness challenge to § 954(d) (1) because he agreed with
the Court that the provision is not unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 622 n.17.
258. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 587. The Court stated that "[i]f the NEA were to
leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a pen-
alty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case." Id.
259. Id. at 588.
260. This analysis will not discuss the Court's treatment of the vagueness chal-
lenge because the issue was disposed of swiftly by all of the Justices who agreed that
the provision was not unconstitutionally vague.
261. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 580. ("To prevail, respondents must demonstrate a
substantial risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of the
speech.").
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the provision existed.2 62 The Court conceded this when, after recit-
ing three instances in which the provision could be permissibly ap-
plied, it stated "that reference to these permissible applications
would not alone be sufficient to sustain the statute against respon-
dents' First Amendment challenge." 263
Requiring something more to uphold the statute, the Court
concluded that, even in other applications, the provision would not
suppress free speech. 264 The Court was influenced by the fact that
the provision is not rigidly "categorical."265 This distinction seems
plausible in light of the many precedents that involved categorical
restrictions and were deemed to be either content-based or view-
point-based. 266
The problem with the lack of a categorical distinction as the
basis for finding the law constitutional is that it ignores the motiva-
tion behind the prohibition on viewpoint-based laws. Underlying
First Amendment analysis is the danger that "the Government seeks
not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpop-
ular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion." 267 Whether the restriction is cat-
egorical becomes inconsequential if the danger of government ex-
clusion of viewpoints is given priority.
The Court has recognized this consideration in the past by ask-
ing "whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it con-
262. See id. at 617-18 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("A facial challenge to a legisla-
tive Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid."). The "overbreadth" doctrine is an exception to this rule. See id.
at 618.
263. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 585.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 581. "Section 954(d) (1) adds 'considerations' to the grant-mak-
ing process; it does not preclude awards to projects that might be deemed 'inde-
cent' or 'disrespectful,' nor place conditions on grants, or even specify that those
factors must be given any particular weight in reviewing an application." Id. at 580-
81. Furthermore, the Court stated "[t]hat § 954(d)(1) admonishes the NEA
merely to take 'decency and respect' into consideration . .. undercut[s] respon-
dents' argument that the provision inevitably will be utilized as a tool for invidious
viewpoint discrimination." Id. at 582.
266. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92-93 (allowing peaceful picketing on school's la-
bor-management dispute, but prohibiting all other peaceful picketing is content-
based law) (emphasis added); R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380 (prohibiting display of any
symbol "which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" is
viewpoint-based law and thus unconstitutional) (emphasis added).
267. Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. at 641. For a discussion of this case,
see supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
35
Vignovic: National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley: The Propriety of Viewpo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
468 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENr. LAw JouRNAL
veys." 26 The Court seems to have viewed the purpose of the provi-
sion as important, since it examined the legislative history of
Section 954(d) (1).269 This led the Court to conclude that the legis-
lation was "aimed at reforming procedures rather than precluding
speech." 270 But, as the concurrence and dissent point out, such a
reading plainly ignores that the adoption of Section 954(d) (1) was
instigated by the public funding of works such as Serrano's "Piss
Christ" and Mapplethorpe's homoerotic photographs.271
The Court was persuaded that both the non-categorical nature
of the provision and the legislative history undermined the danger
of viewpoint suppression. 272 With these propositions in question,
however, it seems that the Court has not eradicated the danger of
viewpoint suppression. Perhaps one can view the Court's contrary
conclusions as stemming from its longstanding practice of constru-
ing statutes narrowly to avoid constitutional problems. 273
The problem with this practice is that it ignores the pragmatic
effect that Section 954(d) (1) has on speech that does not comport
with the decency clause. In seeking to ensure that certain ideas are
not driven from the marketplace, the Court has stated the general
rule that the government may not "regulate speech in ways that
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of another."274 This
standard clearly takes into consideration the underlying goals of
the provision. When Section 954(d) (1) is examined under this
standard, the First Amendment is undermined because, as Justice
Scalia stated in his concurrence, "the decisionmaker, all else being
equal, will favor applications that display decency and respect, and
disfavor applications that do not."2 75
The Court conceded that content-based restrictions are an in-
evitable part of arts funding, but used this conclusion as a basis to
distinguish Rosenberger from Finley 11.276 The issue presented in Fin-
ley II was reminiscent of the Court's recent decision in Rosenberger,
because it involved both an alleged viewpoint-based law and a selec-
268. Id. at 642 (citing Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791).
269. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 581. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of
the legislative history, see supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
270. Id. at 582.
271. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring); See also id. at 603 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
272. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 581-82.
273. See Taylor, supra note 6.
274. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804. See supra notes 44-51 and accompa-
nying text.
275. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring).
276. See id. at 586.
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tive subsidy scheme.277 Rosenberger seemed clear enough to the
challengers in Finley II, for it held that viewpoint-based restrictions
are improper when the government "expends funds to encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers." 278 The Court, however,
distinguished Finley II on the basis that absolute content-neutrality
was "inconceivable" in arts funding because of the competitive pro-
cess in which grants are allocated. 279 Justice Souter, however, made
a strong argument that Rosenberger expressly rejected this distinction
by stating that viewpoint discrimination could not be justified on
the basis of scarcity, which is essentially only a byproduct of
competition. 2 0
The Court did suggest that any actual viewpoint discrimination
in arts funding would be improper. 28 1 This assertion reflects prece-
dent that has clearly established that viewpoint discrimination con-
travenes the First Amendment.28 2 However, the Court's subsequent
statements in Finley II concerning government subsidies and the
First Amendment make the Court's assertion questionable. 28
B. Government Subsidies and Viewpoint
Immediately following condemnation by the Court of the ap-
plication of viewpoint discrimination is a passage regarding the
First Amendment and government subsidies that seems to cut in
the opposite direction. 284 The Court states that, "[a]lthough the
First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context,
... the Government may allocate competitive funding according to
criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of
speech or a criminal penalty at stake." 28 5 This assertion confuses
the majority's analysis because, up to this point, the Court has sug-
gested that it is because Section 954(d) (1) is not viewpoint-based
277. For a discussion of Rosenberger, see supra notes 12549 and accompanying
text.
278. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.
279. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 586.
280. See id. at 614-15 (Souter, J., dissenting).
281. See id. at 587.
282. Se- Rgan 461 U.S. at 550 (stating that even in the provision of subsidies,
Government "may not aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas"); Ragland, 481
U.S. at 221 (concluding that if a subsidy were manipulated to have a coercive effect
then relief could be appropriate); see also Leathers, 499 U.S. at 447 ("[Dlifferential
taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally suspect when it threatens
to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints.").
283. See infra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
284. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
285. Id.
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that it is constitutional. 286 The statement suggests, instead, that a
viewpoint-based restriction might be allowed in arts funding. The
Court cites Rust for the principle that, without violating the First
Amendment, the government may selectively fund projects it be-
lieves to be in the public interest without funding an alternative
activity. 28 7 Furthermore, the Court suggests that the NEA's en-
abling act provides the public interest goal that would allow a view-
point-based restriction. 288
The Court found it unnecessary to work through this analysis
because it determined that Section 954(d) (1) was not viewpoint-
based.289 If, in the future, an arts funding restriction is found to be
viewpoint-based, an analysis of such a consequence might invoke
portions of the decision in Rust. As the Court similarly reasoned in
Rust, in Finley 1I the government has not denied artists the right to
create indecent art; rather, the government has only required art-
ists who create indecent art to do so without federal funding.290
Justices Souter and Scalia both examined the government sub-
sidy issue more fully than the majority, because they determined
that the decency clause was indeed based on viewpoint.291 The
Court's opinion suggests that Rust would be comparable in such a
situation and Justice Scalia and Thomas clearly endorse it.292 The
Court's suggestion therefore, that viewpoint-based restrictions
would be unconstitutional if applied by the NEA is not only unset-
fled, but doubtful.
VI. IMPACT
The Finley !/decision will not affect the way the NEA distributes
funds. While Finley Ilwas meandering through the legal system, the
NEA underwent a number of political and structural changes that
make the Supreme Court's ruling moot as applied to that
286. See id. at 587 ("Unless and until § 954(d) (1) is applied in a manner that
raises concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints, however, we uphold
the constitutionality of the provision.").
287. See id. at 588 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 193). For a discussion of Rust, see
supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text.
288. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 588.
289. See id. at 587 (stating that "[u]nless and until § 954(d) (1) is applied in a
manner that raises concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints, how-
ever, we uphold the constitutionality of the provision.").
290. See supa notes 110-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rust.
291. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 595-600 (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 600-22
(Souter, J., dissenting).
292. See id. at 588-97.
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agency.2 93 At its height in 1992, the agency's budget was $176 mil-
lion, but its 1999 budget consisted of only $98 million in appropria-
tions. 294 NEA review panels, once consisting of artist peers with
experience in the disciplines they were reviewing, have been re-
structured to include non-artists as representatives of community
standards.295 Grants to individual artists, the kind that triggered
the legislation in the first place, have been eliminated. 296 In other
words, any changes that Finley II could implement, have already
been made. 29
7
While the impact of Finley II on the NEA will be negligible, its
effect on the rest of the arts community is not as certain. While the
Court did intimate that an as-applied challenge on the basis of view-
point discrimination would receive consideration by the judiciary,
the very nature of arts funding suggests such an option is un-
likely. 298 As the Court noted, the NEA may decide whether or not
to fund projects for "a wide variety of reasons 'such as the technical
proficiency of the artist, the creativity of the work, the work's con-
temporary relevance, [or] its educational value.' "299 Additionally,
the NEA's determination of "artistic excellence" itself is a subjective
conclusion, that involves personal aesthetic values.300 The presence
of these factors will make it very difficult for an individual litigant to
prove definitively that his or her particular viewpoint led to the de-
nial of funding.30 1
293. See Willa J. Conrad, Dan Bischoff, A moot point? / Supreme Court ruling




297. See Conrad, supra note 295. Walter Weber, litigation counsel for the
American Center for Law and Justice, stated that "[i]f it had come out in the other
direction, it would have been a landmark decision with pernicious consequences,"
putting the Court in the position of telling the agency it must fund indecent and
immoral art. Id. Instead, "[i]t's news because it's a prevention of something that
would have been an innovation." Id.
298. See Finley II, 524 U.S. at 587. This proposition may be undermined by
Justice O'Connor's subsequent conclusion that "the Government may allocate
competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct
regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake." Id. at 588.
299. d. at 585.
300. See id. at 584. See also Taylor, supra note 5. Taylor states that "[a] t a time
when much 'art' exudes political messages and little else, assessments of 'artistic
merit' are often steeped in viewpoint discrimination." Id. Stuart finds it hard to
believe that the NEA advisory panelists who supported Karen Finley's perform-
ance, would have recommended the funding of "a painter who used her technical
virtuosity to preach that a mother's place is at home with her children." Id.
301. See Bernard James, The 'Forbes' and 'NEA'Decisions Approve Greater Govern-
mental Control OverForms of Speech, 20 NAT'L L.J. 50, August 10, 1998, at B15. James
states that "[a] wide range of reasons can be given to justify the rejection of a grant
39
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The practical consequence of business as usual at the NEA with
virtually no individual redress is that artists may be engaging in self-
censorship in order to obtain government funds. Indeed, many art-
ists attest that the promulgation of the decency and respect criteria
and controversy surrounding NEA funding has produced a chilling
effect in the art world.302 Thus, the message of Finley II merely reaf-
firms this practice. Justice Souter's prediction that "makers or ex-
hibitors of potentially controversial art will either trim their work to
avoid anything likely to offend, or refrain from seeking NEA fund-
ing altogether" has apparently come true.303
While Finley H does not warrant a close look on the basis of its
relation to arts funding, at least for the present time, it nevertheless
deserves a careful reading. Finley II is the latest of a long line of
cases including Rosenberger, Rust, and Regan, in which the Court is
defining the contours of the government's ability to participate in
the free marketplace of ideas through its power of the purse. The
contribution of Finley II to the subsidized speech cases remains un-
determined, however, because of the Court's uncertain analysis of
the First Amendment in the subsidy context.30 4
Such confusion about where the Court stands on this impor-
tant issue will surely lead to future litigation. As Congress continues
to respond to public indignation by legislating standards that affect
mediums such as television, music, film and the Internet, the gov-
ernment will find itself again defending its right to place restric-
tions on free expression in the interest of majority values. 305 The
pertinent question after Finley H is just how far the government can
go in this pursuit. In other words, if Congress were to pass a restric-
tion that was not merely "advisory," would the Court find it constitu-
proposal. Getting at the underlying motivations to determine whether any im-
proper motive was a primary reason behind a particular rejection should be daunt-
ing enough to eliminate all but the egregious cases." Id. Such a challenge is
currently underway in San Antonio, Texas, where the Esperenza Peace and Justice
Center, a cultural arts group recently filed suit against the city for violating its First
Amendment Rights when it cut a total of $76,000 in funds for the organization. See
id; See also Gary Cardwell, A Test Case for Arts Funding? Los ANGELES TIMES, August
15, 1998, at Fl. (calling Esperenza "a real test case" after Finley).
302. For an interview with several such artists, see All Things Considered (Na-
tional Public Radio broadcast, July 21, 1998).
303. Finley II, 524 U.S. at 621.
304. See supra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
305. See Jay Rosenthal, Music Industry Should Rally Against NEA Ruling BiLt-
BOARD, August 8, 1998, at 4. (calling for the music community to seek to overturn
Finley.). See supra note 7.
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tional?306 All that is certain is that, if such a case comes before the
current Court, the opinions of Justices Souter and Scalia will loom
large.
Melissa S. Vignovic
306. See David Wagner, Supreme Court Scorecard, INSIGHT ON THE NEws, July 27,
1998, at 18. For a discussion of the possibilities if this issue arose, see supra notes 2-
and accompanying text.
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